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Loretta Lynn v. Sure-Fire Music Com-
pany.  United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit.  2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14050.
“My daddy worked all night in the Van 
Lear coal mines
“All day long in the field a hoin’ corn”
Ah yes, Loretta Lynn, coal miner’s daugh-
ter from Butcher Hollow, Kentucky.  And 
Daddy indeed died of black lung. 
And she married at 15, launched her career 
in 1953 with a $17 Harmony guitar, became 
a Nashville fixture with 16 number-one hits.
In 1961, Lynn contracted with Sure-Fire 
Music Company, giving them world-wide 
copyright interests in her songs in exchange 
for royalties.  In 1966, they re-executed with 
one big difference.  If there was a change of 
ownership of Sure-Fire, the contract “shall be 
null and void.”
i.e., better the bandits you know …
By 2003, the original Sure-Fire owner 
brothers were out and other family members 
in.  Lynn filed in state court for a whole bunch 
of stuff.
To wit: declaratory judgment that contract 
void;  recover master recordings;  breach of 
contract for failing to renew copyrights and 
failing to collect foreign royalties and other in-
juries, all of which were contract or tort claims.
The state court said it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction as the Copyright Act preempted the 
claims.  She had to go to federal court.
So Lynn refiled in federal court asserting 
the same claims.
Of course the opinion says “Lynn.”  It was 
her lawyer.  She was busy writing “Don’t Come 
Home A’Drinkin’.”  And I’m sure her lawyer 
had a delightful time explaining what happened 
next because clients are always so reasonable.
Sure-Fire moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that Lynn was asserting state law claims and 
she should be arguing copyright.  And the fed-
eral district court dismissed saying Copyright 
did not preempt and they had no subject matter 
jurisdiction.
Sure-Fire then appealed, insisting that 
Lynn’s claims lay in copyright.  And we go 
to the Sixth Circuit which hears appeals from 
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee. 
It sits in Cincinnati in solemn, black-robed 
majesty at the Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse.
A federal court has jurisdiction if the com-
plaint invokes federal law.  Caterpillar, Inc. v. 
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Duh.
Lynn’s complaint had 
no federal law.  It was all 
contract law.  But is the com-
plaint, as Sure-Fire insisted, 
preempted by Copyright 
Law?
And what was Sure-
Fire’s strategy?  Were they 
so insistent on copyright 
because they hadn’t violated copyright?
As you’re about to see, Lynn’s lawyer did 
the thing right from the get-go and has gotten 
totally jerked around and stalled.
Preemption can only happen if (1) the work 
is within the scope of the “subject matter of 
copyright” which the songs were;  and (2) her 
state law rights are equivalent to any exclusive 
rights within copyright per 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 
453 (6th Cir. 2001).
Rights protected under Copyright are 
to: (1) reproduce the work;  (2) prepare 
derivative works;  (3) distribute copies; 
(4) in the case of music, to perform it; 
(5) in the case of sound recordings, to 
perform by digital audio transmission. 
Lynn wanted her recordings back 
and her foreign royalties paid over. 
She had to prove the formation and 
breach of a contract.
So the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal. 
But back in state court, she would have to 
appeal their dismissal.  Ye-gads.
Perhaps inspiring her to write “Full Circle.” 
And for her attorney, “All I Want From You Is 
Away.”  
Cases of Note — When Copyright Act Doesn’t Preempt
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QUESTION:  A university librarian asks 
about linking to copyrighted content and 
whether there is any liability when a library 
provides such links.
ANSWER:  In the United States, it is 
settled law that a search engine’s linking to 
copyrighted content is not infringement.  A 
couple of cases from the 9th Circuit U.S. 
Court of Appeals settled the matter.  See Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2003) and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).  The cases 
held that the links actually direct searchers to 
the copyright holder’s website where the full-
size photographic image is stored.  Google 
did not store the images.  Therefore, linking 
is not direct infringement.  The Perfect 10 
court also found that a search engine’s link-
ing could be contributory infringement if the 
search engine’s owners had knowledge that 
the infringing Perfect 10 images were on its 
website and did nothing to take simple steps 
to prevent further damage to the plaintiff.  The 
court went on to find that there was no vicar-
ious liability because the search engine had 
no ability to police the infringing activities of 
third-party websites. 
The situation is less clear in Europe, how-
ever, where some courts have held that linking 
is not copyright infringement, but other courts 
have disagreed.  The distinction appears to be 
whether the link is to the copyright owner’s 
own website or is to a third party’s infringing 
website.  The critical issue is whether the per-
son providing the link knew or should have 
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known that the hyperlink posted provides 
access to a work that has been illegally placed 
on the Internet.
For libraries, as a practical matter, avoiding 
linking to infringing websites should be the 
goal.  It is easy to link to official websites 
while eschewing those that include copyrighted 
motion pictures, music, photographs without 
permission of the copyright holder.  The library 
is unlikely to be liable for such linking but 
would instead receive a cease and desist order 
to remove the link to infringing material.
QUESTION:  A medical librarian asks 
about electronic book collections and what 
guidelines libraries should provide to students 
concerning printing from these books.  Rit-
tenhouse says that it monitors to see if there is 
abusive copying.  Are libraries liable if there 
is such abuse?
ANSWER:  Typically, libraries are re-
quired to provide the copyright warning 
regarding copyright infringement on (or near) 
all copying machines.  If the printing is occur-
ring in the library, then the warning should be 
posted near the printers.  The wording of the 
warning is specified by federal regulations:
Notice Warning Concerning 
Copyright Restrictions
The copyright law of the United States 
(title 17, United States Code) governs 
the making of photocopies or other 
reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified 
in the law, libraries and archives are 
authorized to furnish a photocopy or 
other reproduction.  One of these spe-
cific conditions is that the photocopy or 
reproduction is not to be “used for any 
purpose other than private study, schol-
arship, or research.”  If a user makes a 
request for, or later uses, a photocopy 
or reproduction for purposes in excess 
of “fair use,” that user may be liable for 
copyright infringement.
This institution reserves the right to 
refuse to accept a copying order if, in its 
judgment, fulfillment of the order would 
involve violation of copyright law.
Most importantly, the license agreement 
that the library signed when obtaining access 
to the electronic book controls issues such as 
printing from the work, etc.  So, the first step is 
to consult the license agreement.  If the agree-
ment is too restrictive, approach the publisher 
and ask to renegotiate the agreement.
QUESTION:  The recent changes in the 
Canadian copyright law have caused alarm 
among publishers, especially education pub-
lishers.  Have the changes caused significant 
problems?  
ANSWER:  It is somewhat difficult to an-
swer this question.  When Canada’s Copyright 
Modernization Act was enacted in 2012, the 
publishing industry claimed that the legislation 
ignored the traditional balance of copyright 
interests in reflecting rights and needs of both 
users and copyright owners.  Publishers claim 
that the law tilted too far in favor of users, 
particularly academic users that resulted in 
reduced revenues for educational publishers 
and their authors.  Prior to the revision of the 
Canadian law, educational institutions paid a 
license fee for reproducing copyrighted mate-
rials for students.
New guidelines were developed consistent 
with the revision to permit teachers, instructors, 
professors, and staff members 
in non-profit educational in-
stitutions to reproduce, in 
paper or electronic form, 
short excerpts from a copy-
right-protected work for 
the purposes of research, 
private study, criticism, 
review, news reporting, ed-
ucation, satire, and parody.  A short excerpt is 
defined as up to 10 per cent of a copyright-pro-
tected work; one chapter from a book; a single 
article from a periodical; an entire artistic 
work (including a painting, print, photograph, 
diagram, drawing, map, chart, and plan) from 
a copyright-protected work containing other 
artistic works; an entire newspaper article or 
page; an entire single poem or musical score 
from a copyright-protected work; an entire 
entry from an encyclopedia, annotated bibli-
ography, dictionary, or similar reference work.
The changes have been very positive for edu-
cational institutions that are strapped for money. 
Nevertheless, publishers were concerned that 
some of these publishers would be forced out of 
business because of the changes to the law.  For 
example, textbook publisher Emond Publishing 
ended its high school publishing program.  The 
ultimate impact of these changes on publishers 
has not been studied and documented, however.
QUESTION:  An academic author asks 
about time limits for changing publishers 
when an author wants to change something 
in a work, produce a new edition, etc.
ANSWER:  Typically, this is covered in 
the publication agreement that the author signs 
when adopting a publisher.  So, the first step 
is to consult the agreement to determine the 
duration of the agreement.  There could also be 
territory restrictions in the agreement covering 
the publishers’ rights to publish the work in 
certain areas of the world or in all areas.  
The Copyright Act also provides a time 
period at which all rights the author granted 
can be reclaimed by the author.  The publishing 
contract itself may contain a reversion provi-
sion specifying the point at which the publisher 
will return rights to the author.  For example, 
many university presses revert rights when 
the work is no longer in print.  Termination 
of rights is complicated to understand, but for 
works published after 1-1-78, the contract may 
be terminated 35 after publication as long as 
the author provides notice of termination to 
the publishers and records it with the U.S. 
Copyright Office.  See Copyright Act of 1967, 
17 U.S.C. § 203 (2010).
The Author’s Alliance has published a 
book aimed at assisting authors, Understanding 
Rights Reversion, available for purchase or a 
free download online.  It also maintains a Re-
version Portal at, http://www.authorsalliance.
org/resources/rights-reversion-portal/.  The 
Creative Commons also offers a termination 
tool to help authors, at https://labs.creative-
commons.org/demos/termination/.
QUESTION:  A public librarian saw a re-
cent news note that a court had found HTML 
to be copyrightable and asks, why the change?
ANSWER:  Earlier this year, a federal 
district court did hold that HTML could be 
copyrighted if it met the originality 
requirement.  Both parties offered 
contextual advertising services in 
Media.net Advertising FZ-LLV v. 
Netseer Inc., No. 14-3883, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3784 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 12, 2016).  Their clients put 
ads on their website and when 
visitors click on an ad, they are 
directed to a “search results” page.  Media.
net sued for copyright infringement alleging 
that Netseer copied its HTML that generates 
the search results pages which gave it an unfair 
competitive advantage.
The central question in the case is whether 
HTML is copyrightable.  HTML code is a mark-
up language that merely formats the text and 
files on a webpage.  Most of the HTML at issue 
in this case appears to have been a Cascading 
Style Sheet (CSS) markup, the set of formatting 
rules for a webpage or site.  The HTML on a 
website often includes CSS.  While the content 
of a webpage is copyrightable, whether the 
HTML is likewise protectable is a hard question.
The compendium says that the content of a 
website is material and is copyrightable.  The 
look and feel of a website is not protected by 
copyright and thus cannot be registered.  The 
compendium considers HTML as not being 
copyrightable as a computer program because it 
is not a computer program, but merely formats 
content for display.  Further, the Office will not 
register HTML code as a computer program, 
because HTML does not constitute source 
code.  However, the Compendium also states 
that HTML may be registered as a literary work 
if a human being (rather than a website design 
program) created the code and if it contains a 
sufficient amount of creative expression.  The 
claim may include the HTML code underlying 
an entire website or it may be limited to specific 
webpages.  Ordinarily, CCS is not registrable, 
according to the Compendium.
The district court said that typically, courts 
defer to the Copyright Office but the Com-
pendium is only persuasive and not entitled to 
complete deference.  The fact that the Office 
had registered the work indicates implicit 
endorsement of the validity of the plaintiff’s 
copyright.  The court noted that the look 
and feel of a website is not copyrightable, 
but HTML that produces the look and feel 
is copyrightable.  This is because “there are 
multiple ways of writing the HTML code to 
produce the same ultimate appearance of the 
webpage.”  Here, the court found that the 
HTML code evidenced minimal creativity but 
enough to qualify for copyright protection. 
The plaintiff was given leave to amend its 
complaint to specify what aspects of the code 
Netseer improperly used.  
